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 Viewpoint: Resource Wars 
Energy, Resource Conflict, and the Emerging World Order 
An interview with Michael T. Klare by Barry S. Zellen  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
While terrorism, and the struggle to defeat it, has dominated much of the post-9/11 security 
debate, a new faultline underlying world politics has gained attention in recent years, one that 
could increasingly define our future conflicts. This faultline is defined by natural resources: who's 
got them, who needs them, and who has the means to secure them.  
Indeed, resource conflict and its inescapable logic appears to explain many of the strategic 
moves made by the United States in recent years, and in particular its efforts to transform the 
political landscape of the Middle East, home to the world's largest petroleum energy reserves. 
Opponents of the U.S. military engagement in Iraq often utter the phrase "No blood for oil," 
suggesting that energy resources, and not counter-terrorism, might lie at the root of America's 
Iraq war policy. But it's not just anti-war slogans that suggest the hidden hand of geopolitics 
underlying our current conflict: indeed, many experts of international conflict see international 
competition for increasingly scarce natural and energy resources as a core, and increasingly 
salient, cause of conflict between and within states.  
Michael T. Klare, the Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire 
College, is one of the world's leading experts on resource conflict. He sees natural resources at 
the heart of conflicts past, present and future. A prolific writer and analyst, he is author of 
Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry 
Holt & Co., 2001) and more recently, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of 
America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum (Henry Holt & Co., 2005). His newest 
book on this issue, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy is due out in 
April 2008. 
Strategic Insights had the opportunity to interview Professor Klare, to gain insight into the causal 
link between natural resources and international conflict, and to better understand this 
increasingly important faultline in world politics. 
SI: Has resource competition long fueled military conflicts, from ancient times to the 
contemporary period? How might a lens of natural resource competition help explain past 
conflicts, such as World War II and the Cold War, smaller regional wars, as well as the current 
war in Iraq?   
Klare: Resource competition has been a decisive factor in driving conflict since the earliest 
recorded wars, in the ancient Near East. Then, as now, states fought for control over land that 
was suitable for agriculture—usually river valleys (the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the Jordan basin, 
the Nile basin, and so forth) or areas near springs and oases. Wars have also been fought over 
other valuable resources, including valuable minerals, timber, and spices. 
The great colonial expansion by the European powers that began in the 15th century and 
continued until the early 19th century was largely driven by the pursuit of resources—land, timber, 
gold, minerals, spices, slaves, furs, rubber, and oil, among others—and this outward drive often 
sparked clashes with the indigenous inhabitants of these territories as well as among the imperial 
powers themselves. What we call the French and Indian War (the Europeans call it the Seven 
Years War), for instance, was sparked by conflict between Great Britain and France over the 
control of resource-rich territories in North America, India, Africa, and Asia. Many of the 
skirmishes that led up to World War I, especially those arising in Africa, also had this character. 
During the Cold War, resource-related conflict of this sort was largely subordinated to the 
ideological struggle between the two superpowers but did not disappear altogether. America's 
presidents were perpetually worried about the emergence of radical nationalist regimes in the oil-
producing areas of the Middle East, and this played a key role in shaping U.S. foreign policy 
during this period. These fears led, for example, the President Eisenhower's decisions to 
cooperate with the British in the 1953 effort to topple the nationalist government of Mohammed 
Mossadeq in Iran and then to turn a deaf ear to British and French appeals for support during 
their ill-fated invasion of Egypt in 1956. The overthrow of the pro-U.S. Shah in 1979 and the rise 
of a radical Islamic regime in Iran also provided the backdrop to President Carter's January 1980 
declaration that the United States would use force if necessary to repel any effort by a hostile 
power to block the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf—a declaration widely known as the 
"Carter Doctrine." 
The basic tenets of the Carter Doctrine were cited by President Regan to justify U.S. intervention 
in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 (in the guise of protecting Kuwaiti oil tankers that had been 
"reflagged" with the American ensign), and then by President George H. W. Bush to justify U.S. 
intervention in the First Gulf War of 1990-91, after Iraqi forces had invaded and occupied Kuwait. 
Rather than invade Iraq at that time to eliminate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the 
safety of Persian Gulf oil supplies, Bush I chose to quarantine Iraq and seek "regime change" 
through economic warfare—a strategy then embraced by his successor, Bill Clinton. This strategy 
was seen by President George W. Bush and his advisors as ineffectual, and so, soon after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, Bush II determined that the only way to eliminate the Iraqi threat once and 
for all was through armed invasion. Various reasons were given for this at the time, but I believe 
that future historians will conclude that in many respects the Second Gulf War was a continuation 
of the First, and that both hark back to the Carter Doctrine for their original inspiration. 
SI: Is resource competition playing a greater causal role in the outbreak of armed conflict now 
than in the past?  
Klare: I would say that resource competition has played a key role in the outbreak of war 
throughout history, so it is hard to say if it is playing a greater role today than in the past. This 
having been said, I do think that we can anticipate an increase in the level of resource-related 
conflict in the future because there are no more "virgin continents" waiting to be settled by the 
excess populations of over-crowded, resource-stressed areas. When Europe's resources could 
no longer support its growing population, all sorts of incentives were provided to encourage 
people to resettle in North and South America, in Africa and Australia, and so on.  
 
These territories, in turn, produced surplus food and other resources that were shipped back to 
the motherland. Today, virtually the entire planet is inhabited, and there are very few arable areas 
left that are not under cultivation. As a result, we are seeing increasingly bitter conflicts over land 
in many parts of the world—in a way, the tragic struggle in Darfur is emblematic of this trend. 
The same is true of many other resources. Virtually the entire planet has been scoured in the 
search for valuable sources of energy and minerals, and the rate of new discovery has dropped 
sharply in recent years. Moreover, most of the world's known reserves of oil, natural gas, copper, 
uranium, and other vital materials have been brought into production or are likely to be so in the 
not-to-distant future. This means that we are becoming ever more dependent on a finite supply of 
critical materials at a time when the global demand for these resources—driven, in part, by the 
rise of China, India, and other newly-industrialized countries—is expected to soar. Under these 
circumstances, all of the conditions that might have prompted conflict over resources in the past 
are likely to become magnified. 
SI: In addition to petroleum resources, what are some of the other natural resources whose 
(potential) scarcity could (or already do) contribute to international conflict? Looking ahead to the 
end of this century, what are some of the resources that might cause future wars? 
Klare: Well, in the energy field, natural gas is already a source of conflict. For example, China 
and Japan have squared off over the Chunxiao gas field in the East China Sea. This field extends 
into an area claimed by both countries, and both seek to extract its reserves in order to diminish 
their reliance on imported energy. Neither side has been willing to compromise on the matter, and 
both have threatened to rely on military means if necessary to protect their interests. In the fall of 
2005, moreover, China stationed a squadron of naval vessels on its side of the disputed area 
while Japan began regular flights by maritime patrol aircraft on its side, leading to several close 
encounters between Chinese and Japanese forces—precisely the sort of behavior that could 
easily lead to unintended escalation in some future crises between the two countries. Disputes 
over the possession of offshore natural gas fields could also be a source of conflict between Iran 
and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf, and between the littoral states of the Caspian Sea. 
As more states come to rely on nuclear power for a greater share of their energy supply, uranium 
could also prove to be a source of international conflict. Like oil and natural gas, uranium (at least 
in its most concentrated form) is a relatively finite commodity and many of its most readily 
accessible deposits have already been depleted, so it is not unrealistic to assume that conflict 
could arise in the future over the remaining sources of high-quality uranium ore. 
Diamonds, minerals, and valuable timber supplies have also been a source of conflict in the past, 
and are likely to be so again in the future. Conflicts over these resources are unlikely to involve 
the major powers, but will more likely involve rentier states, warlords, ethnic militias, and assorted 
non-state actors. However, they often produce great humanitarian disasters, like the wars in 
Sierra Leone and the Congo, which in turn spark involvement by the major powers in a 
peacekeeping capacity. 
SI: Is the strategic competition between the United States and China over resources contributing 
to the perpetuation of armed conflicts around the world? Do you see a similarity between the 
current U.S.-China strategic relationship and the pre-WWII relationship between Japan and the 
United States? Might other ascendant powers (such as India) contribute to further resource 
competition and conflict?  
Klare: Yes, the U.S.-China competition is contributing to the perpetuation of armed conflict in the 
world because both powers often seek to cement their ties with potential resource suppliers in the 
developing world by providing them with arms and other forms of military assistance, which often 
then find use in internal conflicts. Thus China, in pursuit of Sudanese oil, has cemented its ties 
with the northern government in Khartoum by supplying a wide range of arms, which reportedly 
have been used in the government's "scorched earth" campaign against SPLA rebels in the 
South. 
Likewise, the United States has assisted the Nigerian government in its crackdown against tribal 
militants in the Niger Delta region, the main center of Nigerian oil production. Both the United 
States and China are also providing arms and military aid to the various regimes in Central Asia, 
and this, too, I fear, will strengthen the tendency of these regimes to rely on force and repression 
to rule, rather than to allow greater democratic participation. 
The situation in the Caspian Sea basin is particularly worrisome because the delivery of arms is 
being accompanied by the formation of incipient military alliances—the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization on one hand, the U.S.-backed alliance of Azerbaijan and Georgia (united around 
protection of the BTC pipeline) on the other. While there is still a great deal of fluidity in the 
situation, I do see this as bearing some similarity to the situation in the Balkans prior to World 
War I. 
SI: With some experts noting evidence of accelerated global warming, how might this affect 
resource competition and international conflict? 
Klare: Global warming will affect resource competition and conflict profoundly. Although global 
warming's effects cannot be predicted with certainty, it is likely that it will produce diminished 
rainfall in many parts of the world, leading to a rise in desertification in these areas and a decline 
in their ability to sustain agriculture. This, in turn, could force people to fight over remaining 
sources of water and arable land, or to migrate in large numbers to other areas, where their 
presence may be resented by the existing inhabitants. Indeed, some analysts believe that the 
conflict in Darfur is partly driven by such phenomena.  
Global warming is also expected to produce a significant rise global sea levels, and this will result 
in the inundation of low-lying coastal areas around the world. Again, the result will be the 
widespread loss of agricultural lands, forcing many millions of people to migrate to higher areas, 
possible encountering resistance in the process. Because many poor countries will be unable to 
cope with the catastrophic effects of global warming, state collapse is a likely result along with an 
accompanying epidemic of warlordism, ethnic violence, and civil disorder. 
SI: Do you have any closing comments to share with us on the relationship between natural 
resources and international conflict? As well, please tell us about your current work. 
Klare: What strikes me about all this that we are seeing the emergence of a new world power 
configuration in which the possession of energy and other key resources is the principal indicator 
of national strength, rather than the possession of military arsenals, as was the case in the Cold 
War era and in prior centuries. 
Russia, once the defeated has-been of the post-Cold War era, has acquired new prominence 
because of its abundance of oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium; the United States, the supposed 
victor of the Cold War, has been found to suffer from significant vulnerabilities because of its 
deep dependency on imported petroleum. 
The more we look into the future, I believe, the more a nation's relative standing in the world will 
be determined by such criteria—this, at least, is the argument I will make in my new book, Rising 
Powers, Shrinking Planet, due out later this year from Metropolitan Books of Henry Holt & Co. 
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